Responder/tools/MultiRelay/impacket-dev/impacket/crypto.py

347 lines
13 KiB
Python

# SECUREAUTH LABS. Copyright 2018 SecureAuth Corporation. All rights reserved.
#
# This software is provided under under a slightly modified version
# of the Apache Software License. See the accompanying LICENSE file
# for more information.
#
# Author: Alberto Solino (beto@coresecurity.com)
#
# Description:
# RFC 4493 implementation (https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4493.txt)
# RFC 4615 implementation (https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4615.txt)
#
# NIST SP 800-108 Section 5.1, with PRF HMAC-SHA256 implementation
# (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-kdf-uses-00#ref-SP800-108)
#
# [MS-LSAD] Section 5.1.2
# [MS-SAMR] Section 2.2.11.1.1
from __future__ import division
from __future__ import print_function
from impacket import LOG
try:
from Cryptodome.Cipher import DES, AES
except Exception:
LOG.error("Warning: You don't have any crypto installed. You need pycryptodomex")
LOG.error("See https://pypi.org/project/pycryptodomex/")
from struct import pack, unpack
from impacket.structure import Structure
import hmac, hashlib
from six import b
def Generate_Subkey(K):
# +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# + Algorithm Generate_Subkey +
# +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# + +
# + Input : K (128-bit key) +
# + Output : K1 (128-bit first subkey) +
# + K2 (128-bit second subkey) +
# +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
# + +
# + Constants: const_Zero is 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 +
# + const_Rb is 0x00000000000000000000000000000087 +
# + Variables: L for output of AES-128 applied to 0^128 +
# + +
# + Step 1. L := AES-128(K, const_Zero); +
# + Step 2. if MSB(L) is equal to 0 +
# + then K1 := L << 1; +
# + else K1 := (L << 1) XOR const_Rb; +
# + Step 3. if MSB(K1) is equal to 0 +
# + then K2 := K1 << 1; +
# + else K2 := (K1 << 1) XOR const_Rb; +
# + Step 4. return K1, K2; +
# + +
# +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
AES_128 = AES.new(K, AES.MODE_ECB)
L = AES_128.encrypt(bytes(bytearray(16)))
LHigh = unpack('>Q',L[:8])[0]
LLow = unpack('>Q',L[8:])[0]
K1High = ((LHigh << 1) | ( LLow >> 63 )) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
K1Low = (LLow << 1) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
if (LHigh >> 63):
K1Low ^= 0x87
K2High = ((K1High << 1) | (K1Low >> 63)) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
K2Low = ((K1Low << 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
if (K1High >> 63):
K2Low ^= 0x87
K1 = bytearray(pack('>QQ', K1High, K1Low))
K2 = bytearray(pack('>QQ', K2High, K2Low))
return K1, K2
def XOR_128(N1,N2):
J = bytearray()
for i in range(len(N1)):
#J.append(indexbytes(N1,i) ^ indexbytes(N2,i))
J.append(N1[i] ^ N2[i])
return J
def PAD(N):
padLen = 16-len(N)
return N + b'\x80' + b'\x00'*(padLen-1)
def AES_CMAC(K, M, length):
# +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# + Algorithm AES-CMAC +
# +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# + +
# + Input : K ( 128-bit key ) +
# + : M ( message to be authenticated ) +
# + : len ( length of the message in octets ) +
# + Output : T ( message authentication code ) +
# + +
# +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# + Constants: const_Zero is 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 +
# + const_Bsize is 16 +
# + +
# + Variables: K1, K2 for 128-bit subkeys +
# + M_i is the i-th block (i=1..ceil(len/const_Bsize)) +
# + M_last is the last block xor-ed with K1 or K2 +
# + n for number of blocks to be processed +
# + r for number of octets of last block +
# + flag for denoting if last block is complete or not +
# + +
# + Step 1. (K1,K2) := Generate_Subkey(K); +
# + Step 2. n := ceil(len/const_Bsize); +
# + Step 3. if n = 0 +
# + then +
# + n := 1; +
# + flag := false; +
# + else +
# + if len mod const_Bsize is 0 +
# + then flag := true; +
# + else flag := false; +
# + +
# + Step 4. if flag is true +
# + then M_last := M_n XOR K1; +
# + else M_last := padding(M_n) XOR K2; +
# + Step 5. X := const_Zero; +
# + Step 6. for i := 1 to n-1 do +
# + begin +
# + Y := X XOR M_i; +
# + X := AES-128(K,Y); +
# + end +
# + Y := M_last XOR X; +
# + T := AES-128(K,Y); +
# + Step 7. return T; +
# +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
const_Bsize = 16
const_Zero = bytearray(16)
AES_128= AES.new(K, AES.MODE_ECB)
M = bytearray(M[:length])
K1, K2 = Generate_Subkey(K)
n = len(M)//const_Bsize
if n == 0:
n = 1
flag = False
else:
if (length % const_Bsize) == 0:
flag = True
else:
n += 1
flag = False
M_n = M[(n-1)*const_Bsize:]
if flag is True:
M_last = XOR_128(M_n,K1)
else:
M_last = XOR_128(PAD(M_n),K2)
X = const_Zero
for i in range(n-1):
M_i = M[(i)*const_Bsize:][:16]
Y = XOR_128(X, M_i)
X = bytearray(AES_128.encrypt(bytes(Y)))
Y = XOR_128(M_last, X)
T = AES_128.encrypt(bytes(Y))
return T
def AES_CMAC_PRF_128(VK, M, VKlen, Mlen):
# +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# + AES-CMAC-PRF-128 +
# +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# + +
# + Input : VK (Variable-length key) +
# + : M (Message, i.e., the input data of the PRF) +
# + : VKlen (length of VK in octets) +
# + : len (length of M in octets) +
# + Output : PRV (128-bit Pseudo-Random Variable) +
# + +
# +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
# + Variable: K (128-bit key for AES-CMAC) +
# + +
# + Step 1. If VKlen is equal to 16 +
# + Step 1a. then +
# + K := VK; +
# + Step 1b. else +
# + K := AES-CMAC(0^128, VK, VKlen); +
# + Step 2. PRV := AES-CMAC(K, M, len); +
# + return PRV; +
# + +
# +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
if VKlen == 16:
K = VK
else:
K = AES_CMAC(bytes(bytearray(16)), VK, VKlen)
PRV = AES_CMAC(K, M, Mlen)
return PRV
def KDF_CounterMode(KI, Label, Context, L):
# Implements NIST SP 800-108 Section 5.1, with PRF HMAC-SHA256
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-kdf-uses-00#ref-SP800-108
# Fixed values:
# 1. h - The length of the output of the PRF in bits, and
# 2. r - The length of the binary representation of the counter i.
# Input: KI, Label, Context, and L.
# Process:
# 1. n := [L/h]
# 2. If n > 2r-1, then indicate an error and stop.
# 3. result(0):= empty .
# 4. For i = 1 to n, do
# a. K(i) := PRF (KI, [i]2 || Label || 0x00 || Context || [L]2)
# b. result(i) := result(i-1) || K(i).
# 5. Return: KO := the leftmost L bits of result(n).
h = 256
r = 32
n = L // h
if n == 0:
n = 1
if n > (pow(2,r)-1):
raise Exception("Error computing KDF_CounterMode")
result = b''
K = b''
for i in range(1,n+1):
input = pack('>L', i) + Label + b'\x00' + Context + pack('>L',L)
K = hmac.new(KI, input, hashlib.sha256).digest()
result = result + K
return result[:(L//8)]
# [MS-LSAD] Section 5.1.2 / 5.1.3
class LSA_SECRET_XP(Structure):
structure = (
('Length','<L=0'),
('Version','<L=0'),
('_Secret','_-Secret', 'self["Length"]'),
('Secret', ':'),
)
def transformKey(InputKey):
# Section 5.1.3
OutputKey = []
OutputKey.append( chr(ord(InputKey[0:1]) >> 0x01) )
OutputKey.append( chr(((ord(InputKey[0:1])&0x01)<<6) | (ord(InputKey[1:2])>>2)) )
OutputKey.append( chr(((ord(InputKey[1:2])&0x03)<<5) | (ord(InputKey[2:3])>>3)) )
OutputKey.append( chr(((ord(InputKey[2:3])&0x07)<<4) | (ord(InputKey[3:4])>>4)) )
OutputKey.append( chr(((ord(InputKey[3:4])&0x0F)<<3) | (ord(InputKey[4:5])>>5)) )
OutputKey.append( chr(((ord(InputKey[4:5])&0x1F)<<2) | (ord(InputKey[5:6])>>6)) )
OutputKey.append( chr(((ord(InputKey[5:6])&0x3F)<<1) | (ord(InputKey[6:7])>>7)) )
OutputKey.append( chr(ord(InputKey[6:7]) & 0x7F) )
for i in range(8):
OutputKey[i] = chr((ord(OutputKey[i]) << 1) & 0xfe)
return b("".join(OutputKey))
def decryptSecret(key, value):
# [MS-LSAD] Section 5.1.2
plainText = b''
key0 = key
for i in range(0, len(value), 8):
cipherText = value[:8]
tmpStrKey = key0[:7]
tmpKey = transformKey(tmpStrKey)
Crypt1 = DES.new(tmpKey, DES.MODE_ECB)
plainText += Crypt1.decrypt(cipherText)
key0 = key0[7:]
value = value[8:]
# AdvanceKey
if len(key0) < 7:
key0 = key[len(key0):]
secret = LSA_SECRET_XP(plainText)
return (secret['Secret'])
def encryptSecret(key, value):
# [MS-LSAD] Section 5.1.2
cipherText = b''
key0 = key
value0 = pack('<LL', len(value), 1) + value
for i in range(0, len(value0), 8):
if len(value0) < 8:
value0 = value0 + b'\x00'*(8-len(value0))
plainText = value0[:8]
tmpStrKey = key0[:7]
print(type(tmpStrKey))
print(tmpStrKey)
tmpKey = transformKey(tmpStrKey)
Crypt1 = DES.new(tmpKey, DES.MODE_ECB)
cipherText += Crypt1.encrypt(plainText)
key0 = key0[7:]
value0 = value0[8:]
# AdvanceKey
if len(key0) < 7:
key0 = key[len(key0):]
return cipherText
def SamDecryptNTLMHash(encryptedHash, key):
# [MS-SAMR] Section 2.2.11.1.1
Block1 = encryptedHash[:8]
Block2 = encryptedHash[8:]
Key1 = key[:7]
Key1 = transformKey(Key1)
Key2 = key[7:14]
Key2 = transformKey(Key2)
Crypt1 = DES.new(Key1, DES.MODE_ECB)
Crypt2 = DES.new(Key2, DES.MODE_ECB)
plain1 = Crypt1.decrypt(Block1)
plain2 = Crypt2.decrypt(Block2)
return plain1 + plain2
def SamEncryptNTLMHash(encryptedHash, key):
# [MS-SAMR] Section 2.2.11.1.1
Block1 = encryptedHash[:8]
Block2 = encryptedHash[8:]
Key1 = key[:7]
Key1 = transformKey(Key1)
Key2 = key[7:14]
Key2 = transformKey(Key2)
Crypt1 = DES.new(Key1, DES.MODE_ECB)
Crypt2 = DES.new(Key2, DES.MODE_ECB)
plain1 = Crypt1.encrypt(Block1)
plain2 = Crypt2.encrypt(Block2)
return plain1 + plain2